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Abstract
We investigate the behavior of consumer con¯dence around national elections in the EU-15 coun-
tries during 1985:1-2007:3. Consumer con¯dence increases before the date of elections and falls
subsequently by almost the same amount. It is able to predict the strength of the performance of
the incumbent party and its probability of re-election both alone and in the presence of macro-
economic and ¯scal variables. The post-election drop is negatively related to the previous run up
and is a function of the political - but not the economic - environment. A similar rise and fall
characterizes consumer con¯dence in the United States.
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11 Introduction
We examine the behavior of consumer con¯dence around national elections. The motivation for our
study is simple, practical and intuitive. If consumers are optimistic about their own future or their
country's future, they are more likely to vote for the incumbent party rather than against it. This
basic intuition suggests that there ought to be a positive association between consumer con¯dence
and the electoral performance of the incumbent. Indeed, while no empirical study up to now has
examined in detail the connection between consumer con¯dence with election outcomes, political
leaders do recognize the fact that a positive association exists between the feelings and well-being of
their constituency and their own chances of being re-elected. Most of them follow closely the various
survey polls that are conducted by independent agencies or by themselves long before the date of the
elections in order to adjust their policies, and often in countries with no ¯xed electoral cycle, in order
to time the elections at the most favorite moment for their party.
Any study of the connection between citizens' optimism / pessimism on their well-being and
election results is usually plagued by a lack of a su±cient number of data points, which are needed for
a precise statistical analysis. In a given country, the number of national election events is small and,
hence, the available time series limited. Moreover, going very far back in the past in order to gain data
points on election events, compromises the reliability of the required economic data. Economic data
of the distant past are scarce and usually carry a di®erent informational content than they do today.
This problem is particularly serious in the case when one is interested to capture citizens' expectations
or attitudes. Surveys do not go very far back in time and if they do, they typically vary in content
across the time periods.
Our study escapes this small sample criticism by exploring a unique data set, which has gone
largely unnoticed by economists and political scientists. The data set consists of the index of consumer
con¯dence in those European countries which joined the European Union. Since 1985, this index is
measured in an identical way across all European Union countries, using the same questionnaire and
the same statistical methodology. From 1985 through early 2007, we thus have the ability to analyze
77 di®erent national European elections, during which we can also measure in a consistent fashion the
level of consumer con¯dence.
2There is an enormous theoretical and empirical literature both in Economics and in Political Science
that deals with the connection between economic variables and election results. Some of the economics
literature is reviewed in the next section. This literature typically deals with the connection between
the electoral cycle and macroeconomic variables and has evolved into a whole new ¯eld in Economics.
Our contribution consists of focusing on consumer con¯dence. Consumer con¯dence has never been
used before to explain election results. The research on consumer con¯dence is so far focused on its
relation to macroeconomic variables, like future consumption.
Our aim is to investigate the relationship between consumer con¯dence and electoral outcomes in
a systematic way. We perform two types of analysis: An event-study, which describes in detail the
evolving behavior of consumer con¯dence and other macroeconomic variables around elections, plus an
econometric analysis which investigates further the evidence that is uncovered by the event study. The
econometric analysis attempts to explain the behavior of consumer con¯dence both before and after the
elections. The behavior of consumer con¯dence before national elections is essentially an exploration
into the ability of the index of consumer con¯dence to predict electoral outcomes, in particular,
whether it has marginal predictive power over and above the same ability of macroeconomic variables.
To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper that tries to extract useful conclusions from analyzing election
results, macroeconomic/¯scal variables and consumer con¯dence, all three sets of variables together
in a consistent empirical framework. The behavior of consumer con¯dence after the elections makes
the econometric analysis complete.
A key ¯nding in the paper is the distinct pattern in the evolution of consumer con¯dence around
election times, as it rises substantially before the elections and falls by an approximately equal amount
afterwards. Another key ¯nding is its distinct pattern between elections the incumbent wins and loses.
Consumer con¯dence does have substantial predictive power for the electoral outcome. Our results,
in fact, suggest that not only the level but also the rate of change in consumer con¯dence is related
to electoral outcomes. We ¯nd that an increase in consumer con¯dence in the last few months before
the elections hurts rather than helps the incumbent party's chances for reelection, suggesting that it
is di±cult for the incumbent to manipulate consumer con¯dence in the last minute in order to gain
an electoral advantage. The consumer con¯dence behavior after the elections seems to be driven by
the political environment, not so by the economic environment.
3The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the data, including their construction and sources. Section 4 explores the
behavior of average consumer con¯dence around national elections using an event-study methodology.
Section 5 presents the econometric analysis of the ability of consumer con¯dence to predict the election
outcome in the presence of other macroeconomic variables that were used in the earlier economics
literature. Section 6 summarizes the evidence and concludes. Finally, in a short appendix we present
visual evidence for the United States, which shows that the basic relationship we ¯nd in Europe,
characterizes the evolution of US consumer con¯dence around US elections as well.
2 A Brief Review of the Literature
Economists have long recognized the connection between the state of the economy and the electoral
cycle. There is an old and fairly large literature on this connection. The early attempts focused on
the e®ects of the state of the economy on the political outcomes and contained little discussion of the
issues that evolved later into the political business cycle literature. Brie°y, this line of research goes
back to the seminal work of Stigler (1973), who examined the connection between the share of votes
of the incumbent party and various economic variables in the context of US elections. His work was
partly motivated by a paper of Kramer (1971) in the political science literature. Many other papers
have followed that work, for example, Arcelus and Meltzer (1975), Bloom and Price (1975), Fair (1978)
and Peltzman (1987).
In the later political business cycle literature, the direction of causality seems to have been reversed.
Now the emphasis was in explaining output °uctuations using the evolution of various political vari-
ables, including electoral ones and assuming rational expectations in a game-theoretic framework. The
seminal work of Nordhaus (1975) was followed by a long line of papers like McCallum (1978), Tufte
(1978), Paldam (1979), Cuckierman and Meltzer (1986), Alesina (1987, 1988a and 1988b), Alesina and
Sachs (1988), Rogo® and Sibert (1988), Nordhaus (1989), Persson and Tabellini (1990), and Alesina
and Roubini (1992).
There is also a long line of relatively recent papers, which continue to work on the connection
between the state of the economy and electoral outcomes, with the causality running in either direction.
4Anderson et al. (in press) examine the post-election satisfaction of electoral outcomes as a function of
various economic and political variables. der Brug, der Eijk and Franklin (2003) try to explain party
preferences via economic and political variables. Dubois (2003) considers both directions of causality,
trying to predict (for France) economic growth with political variables, as well as the incumbent's
share of votes with economic growth. Jordahl (2006) attempts the same for Sweden. Besley and
Case (2002) relate policy outcomes to the importance of institutional variables. Galeotti and Salford
(2001) examine the potential manipulation of electoral cycles and work with empirical models that
assume bidirectional causality (growth regressions and incumbent's share of votes regressions). For an
extended review and additional references on the economic determinants of electoral outcomes see the
paper by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000).
In another more recent strand of related literature, a series of papers by Leigh, Snowberg, Wolfers
and Zitzewitz, attempt to connect electoral outcomes with the state of the economy through the
use of \prediction markets", opinion polling and voter rationality.1 We selectively mention Leigh
and Wolfers (2006), who examine three competing approaches to forecasting elections (econometric
models, opinion polling and election betting); Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005), who examine
the partisan impact of elections on the economy; Wolfers (2005), who links voter rationality and
the state of the economy in gubernatorial elections in the US; or Leigh (2004), who examines the
connections between the state of national and the world economy and electoral outcomes.
Since our paper focuses on consumer con¯dence and elections, we now turn to the literature on
consumer con¯dence. Most of that work focuses on the link between consumer con¯dence and economic
variables. For the bulk of the work, consumer con¯dence is considered an explanatory variable, one
that can potentially improve the predictive performance of models for spending and consumption.
We selectively mention Carroll, Fuhrer and Wilcox (1994), Allenby, Jen and Leone (1996), Batchelor
and Dua (1998), Bram and Ludvigson (1998), Howrey (2001), Souleles (2002), Martinez-Serna and
Navarro-Arribes (2003), Garret, Hernandez-Murillo and Owyang (2005).
We found two papers which reverse the direction of causality, namely they try to explain consumer
con¯dence using macroeconomic and political variables. Vuchelen (1995) explores this direction of
causality for Belgium, where he examines the impact of economic and political variables on the change
1See Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004, 2005, 2006) for more on prediction markets.
5in consumer con¯dence. deBoef and Kellstedt (2004) do the same for the US, where the examine the
impact on consumer con¯dence of both actual economic conditions and the perceptions of the public
about the President's management of the economy. Yet, in none of the above lines of research can we
¯nd evidence on the predictive ability of consumer con¯dence for election outcomes.
The direction of \causality" from consumer con¯dence to election outcomes is left untouched in
the previous literature, perhaps due to the overwhelming amount of work on the connection between
economic variables and electoral outcomes. Most authors probably assumed that consumer con¯dence
contains no additional information that is not already incorporated into economic variables. As we
see later, our results suggest the contrary: consumer con¯dence contains idiosyncratic information in
predicting electoral outcomes.
3 Data and Statistics for Consumer Con¯dence
3.1 Data Sources and Construction of Consumer Con¯dence
Our analysis is based on data for the 15 countries of the European Union, before its recent enlargement.
These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Our data were obtained from various sources. Data on European national elections are available
on various places on the internet. We got ours from the \Parties and Elections in Europe" website2;
it has one of the most comprehensive historical databases that covers most countries in Europe. From
the raw data of the above website, we constructed the political variables of interest, described in the
next section. The sample period in the analysis is constrained by the data availability on consumer
con¯dence. The harmonized consumer con¯dence index starts in 1985, hence it becomes the starting
year for all electoral data. A brief summary of the sample EU electoral statistics is provided in Table
1. We analyze 92 electoral outcomes in 66 of which the incumbent party wins with an average vote
share of 35.9%.
European consumer con¯dence data are publicly available in the European Commission \Business
2Web link at http://www.parties-and-elections.de
6and Consumer Surveys" website3. The consumer con¯dence data are responses to consumer surveys,
based on the joint harmonized EU program of consumer surveys. There are ¯ve surveys that are
conducted on a monthly basis: Industry (since 1962), Construction (1966), Consumers (1972), Retail
Trade (1984) and Services (1996). Consumer Surveys were integrated into the harmonized program
in January 1985 (for 9 EU countries, while the rest were gradually incorporated until May 2001).4
The monthly surveys are carried out in the ¯rst fortnight of each month. There are 12 questions per
month in the survey plus 3 additional questions per quarter.
The Consumer Con¯dence Indicator (our variable of interest) is the arithmetic average of the
balances, B, (in percentage points) of 4 out of the 12 monthly questions. The four questions are:
1. How do you expect the ¯nancial position of your household to change over the next 12 months?
(6 options for the answer)
2. How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12
months? (6 options for the answer)
3. How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change over the next
12 months? (6 options for the answer)
4. Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any money? (5 options for the answer)
Observe that the questionnaire indicator is forward looking, in the sense that it asks consumers to
provide an opinion for the year ahead. The indicator summarizes opinions on the household ¯nances,
the whole economy, unemployment and household savings.
The answers to the questions are usually given by choosing one of six options: PP (very positive), P
(positive), Neutral, N (negative), NN (very negative), Do not know. Aggregate balances are calculated
for each question. Balances are the di®erence (in percentage points of total answers) between positive





4The exact starting dates of availability are as follows: January 1985 for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and UK; January 1986 for Spain and Portugal; November of 1987 for Finland; October 1995
for Austria and Sweden; and January of 2002 for Luxembourg. These di®erent dates of initial availability reduce our
e®ective sample size from 92 to 77 observations.
7and negative answers and are given from the formula:
B = (PP + 0:5P) ¡ (0:5N + NN)
Sometimes, the question does not include the Neutral option. In such a case the de¯nition of B remains
as above. In the event that the question does not include the strongly positive, PP, and the strongly
negative, NN, options, the balance B is calculated simply as B = P ¡ N. Note that theoretically, B
can range from -100 to +100.
Finally, macroeconomic data were obtained from DataStream. We obtained monthly or quarterly
data for nominal GDP, real GDP, total government spending, revenues from indirect taxes, long term
interest rates, the unemployment rate and the Consumer Price Index. As long-term rates, we used the
yields of the 10-year government bonds. In°ation was de¯ned using the CPI, and output growth using
real GDP. The growth rates of government spending and indirect taxes were obtained after expressing
the corresponding variables as percentages of nominal GDP.5 The macroeconomic data span the period
from 1984 to early 2007.
3.2 Distributional and Temporal Statistics for Consumer Con¯dence
Tables 2A and 2B contain extensive descriptive statistics on the time series properties of consumer
con¯dence, on a country-by-country basis. Table 2A contains the statistics on the distributional
properties, while Table 2B contains statistics on the temporal properties of the series. Observe that
consumer con¯dence is not available from the beginning of 1985 for some of the EU-15 countries. In
nine countries, there is a complete time series of 267 monthly observations. All nine countries are
old members of the European Union.6 Spain and Portugal joined the European Union a bit later,
thus they began recording consumer con¯dence in June 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined
the European Union much later in time. Hence, their monthly observations are fewer. All in all, the
5Problems of availability, at the monthly or even the quarterly frequency, do exist for the ¯scal data and they are
another reason of the e®ective sample size reduction.
6Luxembourg is one of the oldest members as well, but the country is too small to apparently a®ord recording all
the statistics required by the European Union. It only began recording consumer con¯dence in January 2002 and, since
that time, only one election took place. That election is included as an observation in the full cross-sectional analysis.
However, Luxembourg does not appear in the individual country statistics of Tables 2A, 2B, 3.
8number of national elections, during the period when consumer con¯dence is also available, declines
from 92 to 77.
Table 2A shows that in ten countries average consumer con¯dence is negative and in four countries
(Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) positive. Greece has the lowest average consumer
con¯dence (-28.07) and Finland the highest (15.04). The standard deviations of the level of consumer
con¯dence vary across the countries. The largest one is encountered in Ireland (14.18), followed
by Portugal (12.06) and the Netherlands (11.59); the smallest in Finland (3.72). In the remaining
countries standard deviations vary in the range between 6.64 (Austria) and 9.69 (Denmark). The
Cramer Von-Misses test for normality rejects the hypothesis of an underlying normal distribution (at
the 5% level) for all but 5 out the 14 countries.7 Only 3 out of the 14 countries have kurtosis in
excess of 3 (Greece with 3.53, Spain with 4.11 and Italy with 4.53). The other countries have sample
kurtosis either close to or below 3. Finally, 9 out of the 14 countries have negative skewness, with Italy
and Spain taking the most negative values, while the rest of the 5 countries exhibit zero or positive
skewness, with Greece taking the most positive value.
The statistics in Table 2B are surprisingly similar across all countries. Consumer con¯dence has
very high persistence, which is consistent with the possibility of long memory. We report the auto-
correlation coe±cients r(1), r(12) and r(24) for lags 1, 12 and 24 months, and an estimate of the
long memory coe±cient, b d.8 The estimated ¯rst-order autocorrelation is in excess of 0.90 for all 14
countries. Despite the very high ¯rst-order autocorrelation, the rapid decay of the autocorrelations at
longer lags provides support for the hypothesis of long-memory rather than the hypothesis of unit-root
non-stationarity.
Turning to the fractal analysis, observe that the estimates of the long memory coe±cient b d are
practically identical across all series and just within the range of stationarity: All are higher than 0.49,
but signi¯cantly di®erent than 0.50 (the p-values of the corresponding test are zero to more than 4
decimals). These estimates, along with the rate of decay of the autocorrelations, strongly suggest the
presence of long memory in all consumer con¯dence series. All in all, the series are best characterized
as being stationary but having strong long memory.
7We use this test as it is has better properties when the underlying series exhibits long memory, see below.
8The estimate of the long memory coe±cient was obtained using the representation of the time series as fractionally
di®erenced white noise (1 ¡ L)
diXit = ²it, where di 2 (¡0:5;0:5) is the long memory coe±cient for country i.
94 Event-Study Analysis: The Evolution of Consumer Con¯dence
around the Time of Elections
In this section we analyze the evolution of average consumer con¯dence before and after the national
elections, both ion a country-by-country basis and across all EU-15 countries. We also examine the
evolution of consumer con¯dence according to whether the incumbent wins or loses the elections. More
speci¯cally, we examine the following questions:
Q1. Is there a pattern in the behavior of average consumer con¯dence, within and across countries,
around the time of elections (12 months before and 12 months after the elections)?
Q2. Is the behavior of average consumer con¯dence di®erent in countries with ¯xed electoral cycles
from countries with variable electoral cycles?
Q3. Is the behavior of average consumer con¯dence di®erent at times when the incumbent party is
re-elected from the times it is voted out of o±ce?
Q4. Are there any di®erences in the behavior of major macroeconomic variables before and after the
elections?
Our focus is on the ¯rst three questions, as the fourth one can probably be considered a con¯rmatory
analysis for the results of the political business cycle literature. The chosen period of 25 months
around elections is arbitrary, but we think is long enough to capture any interesting patterns in the
data without risking a signi¯cant overlap with an earlier or a later election in a given country.
4.1 Country-by-Country Analysis
In Table 3 we compute statistics on the average behavior of consumer con¯dence around election
months and compare them to the rest of the sample period. The variable of analysis is the di®erence
in the standardized consumer con¯dence from month t¡k to month t, yit(k)
def = Xit¡Xi;t¡k.9 Two sets
9Our analysis is done for k = 3, 6, 9 and 12. Results are reported for k = 3, 12 as the rest are qualitatively similar
and are available upon request. Consumer con¯dence is standardized by dividing it by its own times series standard
deviation, sci. Thus the original consumer con¯dence series Cit becomes Xit
def = Cit=sci. This transformation does not
10of comparisons are made per country: In the ¯rst two rows of each country in Panel A, the statistics
are intended to provide a comparison between the months before the elections (row Before) with the
rest of the sample (row All but Before), excluding the months before elections. In rows three and four
of each country, the statistics are calculated in order to facilitate the comparison between the months
after the elections (row After) with the rest of the sample (row All but After), excluding the months
after the elections. In Panel B, these comparisons are formalized via a t-test.10
Our interest centers now on the following questions: (a) Does the behavior of consumer con¯dence
change from the time before to the time after the elections? (b) If such a change in behavior does
occur, how does it compare to the overall temporal behavior of the series, when we exclude elections
from the sample? The answers to both questions (a) and (b) can be seen clearly in Figure 1, where
we plot the country average changes from the rows labeled After and Before in Table 3. We can
see a marked di®erence in those means before and after elections: The average change in consumer
con¯dence before elections is typically positive, while the average change after elections is typically
negative.
Next, we assess whether the pattern of rising and falling consumer con¯dence is signi¯cant when
compared to the evolution of yit(k) in other, non-election months. In Panel B of Table 3 we present
a simpli¯ed t-test statistic, which compares the averages in the change in consumer con¯dence in all
other months except the time period before elections with the months before elections, and similarly
for after elections. The statistic is computed under the hypothesis that there are no di®erences between
these means. The results from this test con¯rm those seen visually in Figure 1. The statistic Ti;s(k)
is very large for all countries and values of k for which a discernible di®erence could be seen in the
graphs. Take, for example, the cases of Germany and the UK for k = 3. For Germany, we have that
Ti;s(3) is larger than 2 for both s = After, Before (-11.81 and 11.85 respectively). For the UK, we
have that Ti;b(3) is again larger than 2 for both s = After, Before (9.08 and -12.69 respectively), as
is also seen in Figure 1. Similar results hold for k = 12 for various countries. From a total of 56 cell
entries in Panel B of Table 3, only 6 or 10% of the cases are lower than 2, strongly suggesting that
the pattern of consumer con¯dence in Figure 1 is statistically signi¯cant.
alter the temporal dependence properties of the series, but makes country sample moments and tests computed from
them, comparable across countries.
10For further details please see the notes of Table 3 and Appendix 2.
11Figure 2 contains 15 graphs, each one showing the evolution of consumer con¯dence in a given
country i, ¹ Zi, i = 1;2;:::;14, around the dates of elections, from 12 months before to 12 months
following the elections. Months are labeled according to their time distance from the election month.
The data for each month are simple averages of the consumer con¯dence of that particular month across
the available election dates of a country. The construction of the average variable ¹ Zi is described in
Appendix 2. Figure 2 provides a sharp visual picture of the evolution of consumer con¯dence, which
is consistent with the results of Table 3: With the exceptions of Belgium and Finland, consumer
con¯dence rises before the elections and falls afterwards.
4.2 EU-15 Average Consumer Con¯dence
We have an unbalanced panel of N = 15 countries over a period of 22 years, which gives us a total of
77 national elections for which consumer con¯dence is also available. We now treat each election event
as a separate sample point and analyze the behavior of consumer con¯dence and other macroeconomic
variables during the period that begins 12 months before the election and ends 12 months after the
election, i.e. a period of 25 months. Our graphical analysis in this section takes cross-sectional averages
across the sample of 77 election events, separately for each month from -12 to +12, with 0 being the
election month. This way we construct the average pattern of consumer con¯dence and of other
macro-variables over a two-year period around election events. We use a similar analysis across the 77
election events to construct standard deviations and to perform further statistical tests. The formal
statistical analysis is described separately in Appendix 2.11
We begin our discussion with the plot of ¹ Z, the average sequence for the main variable of interest,
consumer con¯dence. Figure 3 presents its evolution from month -12 to month +12, revealing a similar
pattern to the ones observed in the graphs of Figure 2 for the individual countries, but much more
sharply. It is very clear that there is an inverted U-pattern in the temporal evolution of consumer
sentiment before and after elections. Consumer con¯dence rises sharply as we approach the election
11Note that the major usefulness of averaging the information of individual countries arises from the fact that our
sample increases and we are able to perform tests of interesting hypotheses that we are unable to do in individual
countries. Also, it is important to realize that in the present event-study context, we have no particular interest in the
calendar (absolute) time dimension of the dataset, apart from the need to keep track of the sequence of elections in each
country; this is required in de¯ning certain variables in the later analysis.
12month and falls sharply after the elections.
The rise and the fall of average consumer con¯dence in Figure 3 is economically and statistically
signi¯cant: The rise and subsequent fall are of about 5 points, which is more than twice the standard
deviation measure b ¾, calculated at 1.65 points. Figure 4 takes a more formal step and presents the
plot of a sequence of paired t-tests for the mean di®erence in consumer con¯dence between the election
month and all other months. We can clearly see in the ¯gure that the di®erences are signi¯cant for
all months, save the month immediately following the election.
Next, we examine whether the rise and fall of average consumer con¯dence around elections are
of equal magnitude. Fitting two straight lines in the rising and falling segments of the sequence, we
¯nd that the marginal e®ect per month is about the same before and after the elections: Letting m =
¡12;¡11;:::;¡1;0;1;:::;+11;+12 denote months before and after the election, Im;1
def = I(m · 0)
and Im;2
def = 1 ¡ Im;1, the estimated equation is given by (standard errors in parentheses):
b zm = ¡5:76(0:27) ¢ Im;1 + 0:40(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;1
| {z }
months before the elections
months after the elections z }| {
¡5:82(0:32) ¢ Im;2 ¡ 0:44(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;2
A test for the hypothesis of equal trend coe±cients with opposite signs, i.e. a test for the equality of
the coe±cients in front of m ¢ Im;1 and m ¢ Im;2 has a p-value of 54%; therefore, consumer sentiment
falls as fast as it rises.
4.3 Consumer Con¯dence in Countries with Fixed and Variable Electoral Cycles
Figure 5 presents a very interesting partition of the information provided by earlier Figure 3. The
countries are split according to whether they have a ¯xed or variable electoral cycle.12 If the election
date can be chosen by the incumbent party, one would naturally expect that the incumbent would
choose to hold elections when sentiment is on an upward momentum. The observed rise in consumer
sentiment in Figure 3 may then simply be the outcome of smart election timing. In countries with
¯xed election dates, this timing is, by de¯nition, non-existent. Yet, we observe that even in countries
with ¯xed electoral dates, consumer sentiment rises before the elections. Thus, a simple hypothesis
12From the 77 election cases for which consumer con¯dence is available, 12 correspond to ¯xed electoral cycles (France-5,
Luxemburg-1, Finland-3, Sweden-3) and 65 to variable electoral cycles.
13of timing based on the momentum of consumer con¯dence seems not able to explain why consumer
sentiment rises before the elections.
More formally, we test the market timing hypothesis by ¯tting a time trend on the evolution of
consumer con¯dence before the elections, separately for countries with ¯xed and variable election
dates, and compare statistically the size of the two slope coe±cients. For completeness, we also ¯t
a second, post-election time trend, as was done above for the full sample. For countries with ¯xed
electoral dates, the estimates equation is as follows:
b zFIX
m = ¡1:33(0:28) ¢ Im;1 + 0:38(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;1
| {z }
months before the elections
months after the elections z }| {
¡3:15(0:32) ¢ Im;2 ¡ 0:01(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;2
The interesting coe±cient here is the slope coe±cient of the time trend before the elections, 0.38,
which is statistically signi¯cant. The remaining coe±cients are also signi¯cant except the one of the
interaction term after the elections, i.e. the -0.01 estimate, which is insigni¯cant. Repeating the
estimation for the case of the countries with a variable electoral cycle, we obtain:
b zV AR
m = ¡6:58(0:32) ¢ Im;1 + 0:41(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;1
| {z }
months before the elections
months after the elections z }| {
¡6:27(0:38) ¢ Im;2 ¡ 0:51(0:05) ¢ m ¢ Im;2
Here all coe±cients are signi¯cant. The interesting test is the test of the hypothesis that the slope co-
e±cient of the time trend before the elections of 0:38 in the ¯rst equation is equal to the corresponding
slope coe±cient of 0:41 in the second equation. The hypothesis of equality which indicates lack of
market timing - cannot be rejected, as its p-value is 62.6%. The two sets of elections do di®er, however
in the post-elections behavior of consumer con¯dence. In the second equation, the post-elections slope
coe±cient of the time trend is negative, large, ¡0:51, and statistically signi¯cant, whereas in the ¯rst
equation there is no time trend, con¯rming the visual impression of Figure 5: The reversal in consumer
con¯dence after the elections occurs only in countries with variable election dates. That reversal is
complete in the sense that the size of the negative slope, -0.51, is statistically not di®erent from the
size of the earlier positive slope, 0.41 (p-value of 13.1%).
144.4 Consumer Con¯dence across Winning and Losing Elections
Next, we separate the election dates by whether or not the incumbent party won the elections.13 We
then calculate the average consumer con¯dence series ¹ ZIW and ¹ ZIL separately for winning and losing
elections and plot them in Figure 6. Clearly, there is a visual di®erence between the two sequences both
before and after the elections. The sequence ¹ ZIW that corresponds to re-election of the incumbent is
always above the sequence ¹ ZIL that corresponds to the incumbent being voted out of o±ce.
The visual impression in Figure 6 is con¯rmed by the tests of di®erences, which are presented in
the ¯rst column of Table 4. If we consider all 25 observations of the 25 months together in a set, we
see that there is a statistically signi¯cant di®erence in the mean and underlying distribution of the
two sequences, ¹ ZIW and ¹ ZIL (but not in their variance).14
As in the case of ¹ Z in Figure 3, we would also like to know if the observed di®erence in trends before
and after the elections for the ¹ ZIW and ¹ ZIL sequences in Figure 6 are of equal absolute magnitude.
We run trend regressions as before, but separately for the two cases. The estimated equation for the
¹ ZIW series is given by:
b zIW
m = ¡4:05(0:27) ¢ Im;1 + 0:38(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;1
| {z }
months before the elections
months after the elections z }| {
¡4:51(0:32) ¢ Im;2 ¡ 0:48(0:04) ¢ m ¢ Im;2
The estimated equation for the ¹ ZIL series is given by:
b zIL
m = ¡9:46(0:37) ¢ Im;1 + 0:43(0:05) ¢ m ¢ Im;1
| {z }
months before the elections
months after the elections z }| {
¡8:77(0:43) ¢ Im;2 ¡ 0:30(0:06) ¢ m ¢ Im;2
When comparing the trend coe±cients across the two sequences, ¹ ZIW and ¹ ZIL, we observe a major
di®erence in the period after the elections. A test for the equality of the trend coe±cients before
13The corresponding election cases where 50 when the incumbent won the elections and 27 when the incumbent lost
the elections.
14To corroborate our results in Table 4 we performed an additional test using a di®erent form of average consumer
con¯dence. Instead of averaging across countries and elections, we averaged across months j of the period before and
the period after the elections (see equation 1 and preceding discussion), as well as across all 25 months surrounding
the election month. Then we examined whether each of these averages di®er according to whether the incumbent gets
re-elected or not. Our results from this approach are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4. In particular, we ¯nd that
there is a statistically signi¯cant di®erence in consumer con¯dence across the two cases during the 12 months before the
election, but not during the 12 months after the election.
15the election has a p-value of 42%, while a similar test for the trend coe±cients after the election has
a corresponding p-value of 1.43%. Consumer con¯dence drops more sharply in times of incumbent
re-election.
4.5 Macroeconomic Variables across Winning and Losing Elections
The event study analysis is now repeated for six core macroeconomic variables: The quarterly real GDP
growth (p.a.), the unemployment rate, the long-term (10-year) interest rate, the quarterly in°ation
rate (p.a.), government spending as a percent of GDP, and indirect taxes as a percent of GDP. Figure
7 includes the corresponding six graphs, each one containing two diagrams, one for the cases the
incumbent wins, ¹ ZIW, and a second for the cases when the incumbent loses the elections, ¹ ZIL.
The evidence in Figure 7 is quite striking and, visually, a lot sharper than the evidence provided by
the earlier political business cycle literature: In the group of elections that the incumbent wins, GDP
is higher, unemployment is lower, in°ation is higher and nominal interest rates are higher relative to
the group of elections that the incumbent is not re-elected. All four variables show that aggregate
demand in the economy is stronger at times that the incumbent wins.15
When the incumbent wins the elections, quarterly GDP growth is consistently higher in all nine
quarters surrounding the quarter of elections. The di®erence between the two series ¹ ZIW and ¹ ZIL
ranges from less than 1% one quarter before the elections to about over 2% one quarter after the
elections. The unemployment rate is also consistently lower in all 25 months surrounding the month
of the elections. The negative unemployment gap between the two ¯gures widens as the date of
elections approaches and continues to widen past the elections month. Twelve months before the
elections, the gap is at its minimum, -0.75%, on the month of the elections it is slightly over -1%, and
six months after the elections, it has gone up to over -1.20%. The in°ation rate is on average 0.70%
higher over the 25 months. The long rate in Figure 7 is also consistently higher in all 25 months
surrounding the month of elections with the gap widening as we move on and pass the election month.
In fact, the average di®erence in long term interest rates across the two cases, which is 1.40%, is a lot
larger than the corresponding average di®erence in annualized in°ation, which is 0.70%. To the extent
15We have re-calculated the ¯gures using deviations from the corresponding country means, to account for possible
¯xed e®ects. The resulting ¯gures were qualitatively identical.
16that current in°ation is a good proxy for expected in°ation, the evidence suggests that at times when
the incumbent wins, real interest rates are higher as well.
Turning to the ¯scal variables, there are clear di®erences across the winning and loosing elections
by the incumbent, but the interpretation of the evidence is not as straightforward. Observe that in the
group of elections that the incumbent wins, government spending as a percent of GDP is higher before
the elections and lower during the electoral quarter and afterwards. This evolution is consistent with
the hypothesis that the incumbent is trying to spend its way towards the elections, an act it reverses
afterwards. On the other hand, indirect taxes as a percent of GDP are higher when the incumbent
wins. This latter empirical regularity is not consistent with notion that the incumbent attempts to
manipulate the tax system to gain an electoral advantage, unless indirect taxes are viewed as a way
of earning revenues without the public realizing it.
In Table 4, we compute statistics for mean, variance and distributional di®erences for each macro-
economic variable of Figure 7. We clearly reject the null hypothesis of equal means and same distrib-
utions for all variables considered.16
5 Consumer Con¯dence and Electoral Outcomes: An Econometric
Analysis
In the previous section we discovered there is a distinct trend pattern in the behavior of consumer
con¯dence around elections, rising by approximately 5 points before the elections and falling by about
the same amount after the elections. Consumer con¯dence is on average higher when the incumbent
wins, but its trend patterns share similarities with the case when the incumbent loses the elections.
Macroeconomic variables also show a di®erential behavior across winning and losing elections, a result
that was expected.
In the present section we dig a bit deeper into the meaning of the previous behavioral pattern of
consumer con¯dence using econometric analysis. We examine the behavior of consumer con¯dence
both before and after the elections. First, we examine whether the level and the rise in consumer
16We repeated the tests using the approach given in footnote 12. The results for the macroeconomic variables were,
again, qualitatively identical to those in Table 4.
17con¯dence prior to the elections does have the ability to partially predict the election results. We
would also like to know if the information on consumer con¯dence can be combined with information
on the evolution of macroeconomic variables to make better electoral predictions. Second, we would
like to know the reasons behind the drop in consumer con¯dence following the elections. This drop
appears more mysterious than the earlier rise in consumer con¯dence. Is part of the drop in consumer
con¯dence the bursting of a possible bubble in earlier consumer optimism? Is it related to other
political and economic factors? The earlier event-study analysis exposes the empirical regularity and
hints at possible solutions, but does not come up with answers.
5.1 Econometric Methodology
We work with two types of electoral variables: A binary indicator for re-election of the incumbent
party and, its continuous analogue, the incremental share of votes of the incumbent party relative to
the runner-up. The latter is a measure of the electoral strength of the incumbent. Both variables are
described in detail later in this section and are de¯ned in Table 5.
Let us denote by yitm the value of the dependent variable in the models presented below for






the value of the (k £ 1) vector of explanatory variables. The dimension k
of this vector is not constant across the di®erent models that we consider. Our models fall into the
GLIM (generalized linear model) class and can be generically represented by:
g(¹itm) = X>
i;t¡p;m¡q¯ (1)
for some 0 · p and some 0 < q · 12. For monthly and quarterly data we set p = 0 and q ¸ 1; for
annual data we set p = 1 and q ¸ 1. That is, we are interested in the response of the dependent variable
to changes in the explanatory variables in the months or quarters or year preceding the elections.
In the above equation, g(¢) denotes the link function, ¹itm
def = E[yitmjXi;t¡p;m¡q] is the condi-
tional mean of the dependent variable and ¯ is the vector of coe±cients of interest. When the
dependent variable is the binary dummy Ritm, which denotes re-election of the incumbent party,







. When the dependent variable is the incremental share Sitm
18of the incumbent, then we use the identity link g(x) = x and the model is simply a linear regres-
sion. Note that the relatively high cross-sectional dimension of the data set does not allow precise
modeling of country di®erences, say through ¯xed e®ects. The number of elections in each country is
small to allow precise estimation of country-speci¯c e®ects via an equivalent number of parameters.
In estimation, we therefore use either a common constant term and apply maximum likelihood when
yitm = Ritm, and pooled or random e®ects (RE) Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with country weights
when yitm = Sitm. We can summarize the estimation methods for our models as follows: When the
dependent variable is the binary dummy of re-election, Ritm, we use a logit link, estimate the respec-
tive coe±cients by maximum likelihood, and assess signi¯cance using a heteroskedasticity-consistent
coe±cient covariance. When the dependent variable is the incremental share of the incumbent, Sitm,
we use an identity link, estimate the respective coe±cients by pooled or random e®ects GLS using
country weights, and assess signi¯cance using a heteroskedasticity-consistent coe±cient covariance.
In our econometric framework, the explanatory variables are predetermined with respect to the
month of the election, as can be seen from the notation of Xi;t¡p;m¡q. Yet, endogeneity can be a prob-
lem. This is because the anticipation of elections can induce the government to take measures ahead
of time in order to boost consumer con¯dence and citizens' feeling of overall well being. Nevertheless,
our later results show that a last minute possible attempt by the government to increase consumer
con¯dence would hurt rather than help its re-election chances.
Even if the government were incapable of manipulating the economy or the sentiment of consumers
in order to gain an electoral advantage, endogeneity can still exist in countries with no ¯xed electoral
dates. In these countries, the government has the discretion to call early elections. Hence, the govern-
ment could try to time the election date so that it coincides with favorable poll results or favorable
economic conditions and consumer sentiment. This type of behavior is not uncommon and would
naturally generate endogeneity. In practice, it is extremely hard to circumvent such an endogeneity
because it is di±cult to ¯nd instruments that are correlated with consumer con¯dence and simultane-
ously unrelated to the governments decision to adjust the date of elections. We have taken two steps to
address this issue. First, earlier in the event-study analysis of Section 4.3, we compared the behavior
of consumer con¯dence in countries with ¯xed election dates with the corresponding behavior in coun-
tries with variable dates. We provided evidence that the behavior of consumer con¯dence before the
19elections is similar across the two groups, suggesting a potential absence of market-timing endogeneity.
Second, in the present econometric analysis, we partially account for potential endogeneity problems
by providing a robustness check, using instrumental variables in the context of a GMM-based model.17
As we will see, our results still hold even when we use this alternative estimation method.
5.2 Does Consumer Con¯dence have Predictive Power?
We next turn our attention to the estimation results on the predictive ability of consumer con¯dence
for the probability of the incumbent party to be re-elected as well as its relative electoral strength in
terms of share of votes. Table 5 presents all the de¯nitions of the variables used in the econometric
analysis. Subsequently, Tables 6A and 6B present the estimation results.
To ease the exposition, we have categorized the included explanatory variables of Tables 6A-6B into
six groups of variables: The M1 group of variables includes the level of consumer con¯dence during
the month before the elections, C1, plus the recent trend in consumer con¯dence from 7 months prior
to the election to the month before the election, C1 ¡ C7. The M2 group of variables includes three
macroeconomic variables: the annual real GDP growth up to the quarter of the elections, RGDP,
the monthly in°ation of the month before the elections, INF, and the level of the average 10-year
government bond yield in the month before the election, BY LD. The M3 group of variables is
the union of the previous two groups, as it includes both the consumer con¯dence variables and the
macroeconomic variables. The M4 group of variables adds to the M3 group, the growth in government
spending as a fraction of GDP from the quarter before the elections to the quarter of the elections,
G=GDP. The M5 group of variables adds to the M3 group, the growth in indirect taxes as a fraction
of GDP from the quarter before the elections to the quarter of the elections, T=GDP. Finally, the
M6 group of variables includes the M1 group plus a lagged dependent variable - this corresponds to
the model estimated by GMM for robustness checking.
The two consumer con¯dence variables, when included alone in the models, are very strong in
predicting the relative share of the incumbent. The coe±cient 0.14 of C1 in the random e®ects
model implies that, ceteris paribus, if the level of consumer con¯dence is higher by 10 points, then
17We treat the problem as one of estimation method and not as one of choice of instruments, as we have little or no
choice of other instruments in the context of our dataset.
20the incumbent's relative share of votes increases by 1.4 percentage points. This is a large increase
compared to the sample average relative share which is 4.9 percentage points (see Table 1). The trend
coe±cient -0.27 in the same model, implies that, ceteris paribus, if the level of consumer con¯dence one
month before the elections rises by an extra 10 points relative to 7 months before the elections, then
the incumbent's relative share of votes decreases by 2.7 percentage points. The negative coe±cient
in the trend suggests that it does not help to raise consumer con¯dence a few months before the
elections. If consumer con¯dence is to be of any help to the incumbent, it better be high up at least
7 to 9 months before the elections. When it comes to the probability of winning the elections, the
results are similar to the results from the models of the relative share of votes. The coe±cient of C1
is positive and the coe±cient of the trend C1 ¡ C7 is negative, albeit not as statistically strong as
in the other models. Note that in all three models with the M1 group of variables, the explanatory
power of the two consumer con¯dence variables is not very high, approximately 5% (see Table 6B).
When the macro variables are alone in the models as in the M2 group, they tend to explain
anywhere from 17% to 23% of the variation of the dependent variable. Real GDP and the long-term
interest rate have the strongest explanatory power. In°ation is signi¯cant only in the logit estimation
of the probability of re-election.18 The coe±cient signs are intuitive and consistent with earlier Figure
7: A higher level of GDP is associated with a higher probability of re-election for the incumbent plus a
bigger (more positive) di®erence in votes from the runner up. For example, an extra percentage point
in real GDP growth relates to an extra 1.03 or 1.25 percentage point in votes above the runner up.
Recall that in the economics literature from the US electoral cycle, this positive association is very
weak (Alesina and Roubini [1992]). Here the evidence is clear. Observe also that a higher long-term
rate is also good news for the incumbent, as Figure 7 has already shown. Apparently, at times when
the economy does well, interest rates are high, as aggregate demand is high. Finally, consistent with
the argument of Nordhaus (1975), a higher in°ation hurts the incumbent, decreasing its probability
of re-election and the extra votes it may get relative to the runner up.19 Note that in Figure 7 we
have that in°ation is higher when the incumbent gets re-elected. However, in the econometric analysis
18The unemployment rate loses its statistical signi¯cance in the presence of the other three macro variables. Hence, it
is not included in the current discussion.
19In the econometric analysis with the M2 group of variables, the number of observations declines from 92 to 78
because in some countries the long-term interest rate is not available.
21we control for other economic variables and we get a negative sign in the corresponding coe±cient
estimate.
When both the consumer con¯dence variables and the macro variables are included in the models
in the M3 group of variables, the results remain qualitatively the same, while the joint explanatory
power shoots up to anywhere from 22% to 32%. Statistically, the consumer con¯dence variables
become substantially stronger, while the macro-variables stay as before. Hence, it becomes evident
that consumer con¯dence has extra predictive power for the probability of re-election of the incumbent
party and for its electoral strength over and above the information that is already captured by the
macroeconomic variables. This result is quite impressive, particularly if one were to also take into
account the fact that some of the macro variables are not fully publicly available at the time before the
elections. Some of those macro variables are, in fact, substantially revised well after the period they
are originally announced. By including variables that describe the macro-economy and are potentially
correlated with consumer con¯dence, but are not clearly observed by consumers or anyone else, we
tend to take away some of the extra explanatory power of consumer con¯dence.
The predictive power of consumer con¯dence is also evident in Figure 8, which plots the cumulative
probability of re-election as a function of the level of consumer con¯dence. It is clear from the ¯gure
that positive levels of consumer con¯dence are associated (on average) with probability of re-election
exceeding 80%. For negative levels of consumer con¯dence, there is a linear increase in the probability
of re-election for every point increase in consumer con¯dence. We ¯t two linear regressions for the
segments [-40,0] and [0,+40] of consumer con¯dence to obtain a quantitative measure of the e®ect of
increases in consumer con¯dence on the probability of re-election. For the ¯rst segment, a 10 point
increase in consumer con¯dence leads to an average increase of 11% in the probability of re-election.
For the second segment, a 10 point increase in consumer con¯dence leads to an average increase of 4%
in the probability of re-election. To gauge the magnitude of these estimates remember that average
consumer con¯dence for the 12 month period before the election was in the range of about -10 to -5
with an overall standard deviation of 1.65.20
20The probability distribution appearing in the ¯gure was calculated from model M3 for consumer con¯dence taking
values in a discrete grid from -40 to +40 and the rest of the variables being ¯xed at their respective sample means.
Results from other models were qualitatively similar.
22Next, we add to the previous list of consumer con¯dence and macro variables two ¯scal variables,
in turn, government spending in the M4 group of variables, and indirect taxes in the M5 group of
variables. The number of available observations is now much smaller, as the two ¯scal variables are not
as easily available on a quarterly frequency. The explanatory power of the earlier variables remains and
the ¯scal variables have the intuitive sign. Namely, when incumbents spend more they get re-elected
more easily. When they raise indirect taxes, they lower their probability of re-election. It is interesting
to note that the econometrics provides a more intuitive story here than the event study graph for
indirect taxes did in Figure 7. In that ¯gure, indirect taxes seemed to have a positive association
with the probability of re-election, yet when one controls for all the macro-economic information, the
association is negative, as expected.21
The GMM model of the M6 group of variables provides a robustness check against the possibility of
endogeneity and, alternatively, as a check against the GLS estimation method. Here we use a dynamic
panel model, which includes a lagged dependent variable, with dynamic instruments coming only from
lags of the dependent variable. In this way we remain agnostic about the nature of other explanatory
variables as instruments and can provide a robustness check for our earlier results. The results are
even more strongly supportive of the ability of consumer con¯dence to predict the election strength
of the incumbent. Consumer con¯dence remains highly signi¯cant while from the other economic
variables only the long-term rate remains signi¯cant. However, one should interpret the results with
some caution as the use of dynamic instruments reduces the sample size drastically.
5.3 Why does Consumer Con¯dence Fall after the Elections?
So far we investigated the predictive ability of consumer con¯dence for the electoral outcome. In this
subsection, we explore the behavior of consumer con¯dence after the elections. Our event study in
Section 4 documented that consumer con¯dence declines following the elections by as much as it rises
before the elections. The present econometric analysis tries to explain the behavior after the elections
using predetermined variables.
21These speci¯cations probably bare the highest similarity to the speci¯cations and results in Galeotti and Salford
(2001), who estimate a vote function with dependent variable the share of votes for the incumbent. Their explanatory
variables include GDP, in°ation, unemployment, public spending and tax revenues.
23We ¯rst investigate whether the fall in consumer con¯dence is related to the earlier rise in a
systematic way. We, therefore, regress the change in the level of consumer con¯dence 7 months after
the elections, Ca7 ¡ C0, on the size of the previous run up, C0 ¡ C7. The results are presented in
the ¯rst two rows of Table 7. Indeed, as expected, the association is negative, i.e. the larger the rise
in consumer con¯dence up to the elections, the larger the fall after the elections. This coe±cient is
robust, as it remains the same in all speci¯cations. This negative association suggests that part of
the earlier rise was due to unwarranted optimism. The slope coe±cient is, however, lower than unity,
implying that only about a third of the previous rise may be due to overly optimistic expectations, i.e.
for every 10-point increase in consumer con¯dence in the seven months prior to elections, consumer
con¯dence drops by only a 3 points after the elections.
Next, we add some political variables of interest in order to capture the possibility that the political
environment may be associated with the decline in consumer sentiment. One such variable is the
winner's share WSH, which represents the percentage of votes the winner earns during the elections,
whether the winner happens to be the incumbent or not. This variable captures a somewhat similar
e®ect as the pre-election rise in consumer con¯dence: the higher it is, the stronger was pre-election
enthusiasm for the winning party. The results are presented in rows three and four of Table 7. The
explanatory power in the cross-sectional regression now shoots up to 21-22%. Indeed, we ¯nd a
strong negative association between the size of the winner's share of votes and the change in consumer
con¯dence. The more votes the winner gets, the larger the disappointment. Note that the presence
of WSH makes the pre-election trend, C0 ¡ C7, less signi¯cant than before, when it entered the
regression as a single explanatory variable. This suggests that both variables capture a common pre-
election enthusiasm, perhaps by di®erent groups of voters, which then transforms into post-election
disappointment.
We subsequently augment the set of explanatory variables by adding the winner's orientation WO
(a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the winner is a center-right party), its interaction
with the pre-election trend in consumer con¯dence WO £ C0 ¡ C7 and a dummy variable D30 that
proxies for the e®ects of small winning parties and coalition governments.22 The winner's political
22D30 takes the value of unity if the winner's share of votes is less than 30% and zero otherwise. The 30% cut-o®
point corresponds to about one-fourth of the sample observations.
24orientation seems to matter. There is a ¯xed component of extra disappointment, worth 4.6 (in the
pool-GLS estimation) or 3.4 (in the RE-GLS estimation) points if the winner is center right, with
a simultaneous absence of a relation to the previous run up in consumer con¯dence. The latter is
due to the fact that the relation of Ca7 ¡ C0 to C0 ¡ C7 in the cases the winner is center-right is
approximately zero: the sum of the relevant coe±cients almost cancel one another. Finally, the e®ects
of D30 suggest that cases of smaller winners and coalitions are associated with less post-election
disappointment compared to large, one-party governments. Note that the presence of small winning
parties mitigates the negative e®ects of a center-right winner; a test for equal coe±cients with opposite
signs for the WO and D30 variables yields p-values equal to 22% and 71% for the pooled GLS and
random e®ects GLS respectively.
Finally, in the above framework, we included several economic variables but none of them came
out (individually or jointly) signi¯cant.
6 Summary and Conclusions
In the paper we explore the link between consumer con¯dence and electoral outcomes, a relationship
that has so far escaped the attention of both economists and political scientists. Yet, there is a
strong relation between the two variables, with consumer con¯dence rising before the elections and
falling afterwards. Our analysis ¯rst focused on the temporal evolution of consumer con¯dence around
the time of national elections, over a 25-month interval from month -12 to month +12, in which we
ignored the calendar date and de¯ned as month 0, the month of elections. In this event-type of study,
we uncovered that consumer con¯dence rises substantially before the elections and falls subsequently
in the overwhelming majority of EU-15 countries. This empirical regularity is particularly striking
when we plot the average index of consumer con¯dence across all EU-15 election dates for each month
in the 25-month interval, as in Figure 3. Average consumer con¯dence rises by about ¯ve points in the
12-month period prior to the elections, which is an economically and statistically signi¯cant increase.
In the 12 months after the elections, consumer con¯dence moves in the opposite direction, falling by
approximately the same amount, 5 points.
The event-study uncovered two additional regularities: First, the rise in consumer con¯dence prior
25to elections is similar across countries with ¯xed and countries with variable electoral dates, suggesting
the absence of an obvious timing in the government's decision to call early elections based on the level
of consumer sentiment. Second, consumer con¯dence is uniformly higher over the 25-month period
during the elections the incumbent wins relative to those elections the incumbent loses. Yet, in both
cases, the inverted U-shaped pattern remains.
The event-study was also carried over to some key macroeconomic and ¯scal variables. This
evidence is con¯rmatoty of the earlier literature, yet visually a lot sharper. Annual GDP growth over
the nine quarters around the elections in the cases when the incumbent wins is higher by about half
a percentage point than the cases when the incumbent loses the elections. Unemployment is similarly
lower and the gap is rising after the elections to over one percentage point. The long term interest rate
is higher when the incumbent wins, with the di®erence getting bigger after the elections to about two
percentage points. In°ation is similarly higher. All four variables point to high aggregate demand in
the economy at times the incumbent wins the elections. Government spending as a fraction of GDP
is also higher during the elections that the incumbent wins.
The econometric analysis that followed clari¯ed some of the regularities that the event-study un-
covered. We examined the behavior of consumer con¯dence both before and after the elections. We
found that consumer con¯dence can predict the size of votes the incumbent will get relative to its
opponents as well as the probability of winning the elections. This informational content is distinct
from that of standard macroeconomic variables. A variety of econometric speci¯cations indicate that
consumer con¯dence has extra predictive power, not included in the usual macroeconomic variables
of output, unemployment, interest rates, in°ation, government spending or taxes. Moreover, it is the
level of consumer con¯dence that predicts positively the electoral outcome, not the rise in consumer
con¯dence in the last few months. Our variable which captures the upward trend in consumer con¯-
dence prior to the elections carries a negative sign, suggesting that the incumbent party cannot easily
manipulate the level of consumer con¯dence in the last few months prior to the elections in order to
gain an electoral advantage. Put di®erently, a sudden rise in consumer con¯dence in the last 7 months
prior to elections is a sign of possible defeat. Consumer con¯dence has to be at a relatively high level
at least 7 months before the elections for it to give an electoral advantage to the incumbent party.
The behavior of consumer con¯dence after the elections is driven by what happened before the
26elections and by the political environment. We found that the higher the previous upward trend,
the larger the subsequent fall. Hence the post-elections disappointment seems to be related to the
pre-elections consumer optimism. This disappointment is also larger, the bigger the share of votes the
winner gets, suggesting a pre-election abnormal enthusiasm for the winner. The political orientation
of the winner and the possibility of large party governments also explain a component of post-election
disappointment.
Overall, there is a systematic pattern in consumer con¯dence and major macroeconomic variables
around election times, which shows a sharp distinction across the cases the incumbent party wins and
looses. An appendix provides a similar visual story for consumer con¯dence in the United States.
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31Appendix 1
Consumer Con¯dence and Elections: Not Just a European Phenomenon
Event Study Analysis for the United States
Our analysis in the main part of the paper is con¯ned to EU-15 but it is of considerable interest
to examine whether a similar relationship between consumer con¯dence and elections exists for the
United States. The US has a considerably lengthier record for the index of consumer con¯dence
from two di®erent sources, the University of Michigan and the Conference Board. While a formal
econometric analysis would be restricted by the sample length, we can easily produce ¯gures similar
to Figures 3 and 6 about the behavior of consumer con¯dence around elections and about the behavior
when the elections data points are split into two groups according to the election result.23
Using data from both the University of Michigan (monthly from 1978) and the Conference Board
(bi-monthly, from 1967 though mid-1977, monthly afterwards), we construct four additional ¯gures
about the evolution of consumer con¯dence over the 25-month period surrounding US elections, from
month -12 to month +12. Our electoral data are outcomes of US presidential elections from 1980 to
2004 for the University of Michigan data and from 1968 to 2004 for the Conference Board data. The
results are summarized in Figure 9, top panel, for the University of Michigan data, and in Figure 9,
lower panel, for the Conference Board data.
The University of Michigan data provide results that are in close agreement with the results pre-
sented in the main part of the paper. The inverted U shape in the evolution of consumer con¯dence
appears again and the average levels of consumer con¯dence are systematically higher when the in-
cumbent is re-elected. Speci¯cally, let ¢ ¹ C¡
def = ¹ C0 ¡ ¹ C¡12 and ¢ ¹ C+
def = ¹ C+12 ¡ ¹ C0, where ¹ Ct denotes
the average (across elections) consumer con¯dence at month t. For the series in the left top panel of
Figure 9 we have that ¢ ¹ C¡ = 9:25 and ¢ ¹ C+ = ¡6:82; for the two series in right top panel in Figure
9 we have ¢ ¹ CIW
¡ = 8:5 and ¢ ¹ CIW
+ = 0:37, when the incumbent is re-elected, and ¢ ¹ CIL
¡ = 10:00
and ¢ ¹ CIL
+ = ¡14:00, when the incumbent is not re-elected. These numbers are in accord with the
empirical ¯ndings for the European Union: consumer con¯dence rises before the elections and falls
thereafter, with the pre-election rise being faster in the case when the incumbent is not re-elected.
23The questionnaires in the two surveys di®er from the questionnaire in the European survey, thus the results ought
to be analyzed separately. A lengthier analysis of the US surveys is beyond the scope of the present paper.
32The Conference Board data provide a similar but not identical pattern. There is still a discernible
inverted U shape in the evolution of consumer con¯dence, but that shape is not as symmetric as before
and the peak in average consumer con¯dence occurs one month after the elections. When we split the
sample into two groups of elections according to the election outcome, we continue to observe a clear
dominance in consumer sentiment during those elections when the incumbent is re-elected, except for
months -12 through -8. The di®erences ¢ ¹ C¡ and ¢ ¹ C+ for the series in the left lower panel of Figure
9 are 8.34 and -4.93 respectively, still showing that consumer con¯dence rises before the elections and
falls after. For the two series in the right lower panel in Figure 9, when the incumbent gets re-elected
¢ ¹ CIW
¡ = 12:12 and ¢ ¹ CIW
+ = 5:7; here consumer con¯dence continues to rise, albeit more slowly
than it did before the elections. When the incumbent does not get re-elected, ¢ ¹ CIW
¡ = 4:56 and
¢ ¹ CIW
+ = ¡13:08; here consumer con¯dence does not rise as fast as it subsequent drops, something
that we have not seen in previous ¯gures, either for the US or the European Union.
All in all, there is a similar pattern in the evolution of consumer con¯dence in the case of US
elections to the pattern we observed in Europe. This ¯nding further corroborates our arguments
in the main text and calls for further research in the relationship between consumer con¯dence and
electoral outcomes.
33Appendix 2
The Construction of Average Statistics for the Event-Study
Let us create an arti¯cial time index - corresponding to electoral time - where we group together
elections across countries: for t = 1 we group the ¯rst 15 available elections, the ¯rst election of each
country in the sample. These elections di®er on their calendar time, i.e. some occurred in 1985, others
in 1986 and so on. For t = 2 we group the next 15 (or less) available elections, i.e. the second election
of each country in the sample for the countries that it exists. We continue to do that for each country
until we run out of election events. Let nie denote the number of election events in country i. Our
index t will run form t = 1 to t = ne, where ne
def = max
i
nie, denotes the maximum nie across the 15
countries. Note that there is an overlap of calendar years with this timing scheme, but that is of no
consequence in the ensuing analysis as there is no overlap of elections for each country in the panel.
Next, let us denote by zitm the value of any variable of interest for country i, at electoral
time t where the election occurs in month m. The ¯rst step in our analysis is to examine the
temporal evolution of such a variable around election time, speci¯cally twelve months prior and
twelve months after the election month. That is, we want to examine the time path of the se-
quence Zi
def = (zit;m¡12;:::;zit;m¡1;zitm;zit;m+1;:::;zit;m+12). We are mainly interested in the evo-
lution of the country averages and EU averages for each month. Thus, we compute the coun-
try i average sequence ¹ Zi
def = (¹ zi;¡12;:::; ¹ zi;¡1; ¹ zi;0; ¹ zi;+1;:::; ¹ zi;12) and EU average sequence ¹ Z
def =


















nie denotes all available observations in month j before
or after the elections.
In order to gauge the relative magnitude of the values a sequence like ¹ Z from month to month
we need some measure of overall `standard deviation'. For this purpose we compute the standard
deviation of the average ¹ zj for each month j around the elections and then take the average of these
standard deviations. That is, if we denote by sj the sample standard deviation of zit;m§j, denote by





















A similar procedure is used to compute a measure b ¾i for each individual country.
Of additional interest is the average temporal evolution of a variable when the incumbent party
wins the election and when the incumbent party looses the election.24 In a way similar to the one
above, we compute two sequences of country averages which we denote by ¹ ZIW, when the incumbent
wins, and by ¹ ZIL, when the incumbent looses. Let Ritm denote a binary dummy variable that takes
the value of one when the incumbent party is re-elected.25. Then, the jth elements of the two sequences
























We can now use these two sequences of averages to examine the possible distributional di®erences that
exist between the cases when the incumbent is re-elected and not re-elected.
24Note that this kind of analysis, taking into account whether the incumbent wins or not, could not be done e®ectively
in the country-by-country setting because of the limited number of elections in our sample. Therefore, the results of this
section are novel and are not just \average duplicates" of those of the previous section.
25As incumbent party at electoral year t is de¯ned the party with the highest percentage of votes in the elec-
tions of electoral year t ¡ 1; this is the party that we consider as the \winner" of the elections at t ¡ 1, even
if the party does not form an autonomous government. Therefore, our variable is formally de¯ned as Ritm
def =
I(winner of elections at year t ¡ 1 wins again at year t), where I(¢) is the indicator function.
35Tables and Figures
Table 1: Statistics on EU National Elections, 1985:1-2007:3
Total sample size: 92 National Elections
Share of Share of Elections when Incremental Share Elections when
Winner Runner-up Incumbent of Incumbent Center-Right
in all elections in all elections Wins in all elections Wins
# Observations 92 92 66 92 41
Average share 35.3% 26.9% 35.9% 4.9% 35.6%
Std. Deviation 8.7% 7.7% 8.4% 9.4% 9.2%
1. The 92 elections over the period 1985:1-2007:3 are distributed as follows: Austria 7, Belgium 6, Denmark
7, Finland 6, France 5, Germany 6, Greece 7, Ireland 5, Italy 6, Luxembourg 5, Netherlands 7, Portugal
7, Spain 6, Sweden 7, United Kingdom 5.
2. Average share and standard deviation refer to the sample average percentage of votes and corresponding
sample standard deviation for each variable.
3. \Winner" refers to the party with the highest percentage of votes in an election; \runner-up" refers to
the party with the second highest percentage of votes in the same election.
4. The incremental share of the incumbent refers to the di®erence in the percentage of votes between the
incumbent and the winner (when the incumbent looses the election and is, therefore, a negative number)
or the incumbent and the runner-up (when the incumbent wins the election and is, therefore, a positive
number).
36Table 2A: Descriptive Statistics for Consumer Con¯dence
Distributional Characteristics
Obs. Sample Begins Elections Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N-test
Belgium 267 Jan. 85 6 ¡6.74 9.32 ¡0.07 2.94 0.10
Denmark 267 Jan. 85 7 3.86 9.69 ¡0.44 2.12 0.00
Germany 267 Jan. 85 6 ¡8.54 8.46 ¡0.25 2.09 0.00
Greece 267 Jan. 85 7 ¡28.07 8.18 0.81 3.53 0.00
Spain 250 Jun. 86 6 ¡10.76 8.41 ¡0.76 4.11 0.00
France 267 Jan. 85 5 ¡18.19 8.42 0.05 2.37 0.00
Ireland 267 Jan. 85 5 ¡8.24 14.18 0.06 1.93 0.00
Italy 267 Jan. 85 6 ¡12.93 6.88 ¡0.93 4.34 0.00
Netherlands 267 Jan. 85 7 4.53 11.59 0.15 2.48 0.26
Austria 138 Oct. 95 4 ¡0.62 6.64 ¡0.15 2.40 0.05
Portugal 250 Jun. 86 6 ¡21.28 12.06 ¡0.20 1.89 0.00
Finland 137 Nov. 95 3 15.04 3.72 ¡0.29 2.36 0.07
Sweden 138 Oct. 95 3 8.18 7.22 0.07 2.80 0.37
United Kingdom 267 Jan. 85 5 ¡8.07 7.62 ¡0.50 2.44 0.00
Notes:
1. All results are based on the original consumer con¯dence series Cit.
2. Sample ends on March 2007 for all countries.
3. Mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis correspond to the usual sample moments.
4. N-test gives the p-value of the Cramer Von-Misses test for normality.
5. Luxembourg began recording Consumer Con¯dence statistics in January 2002. One election has occurred since
then.
37Table 2B: Descriptive Statistics for Consumer Con¯dence
Temporal Characteristics
r(1) r(12) r(24) b d
Belgium 0.938 0.372 0.126 0.499
Denmark 0.957 0.717 0.524 0.499
Germany 0.961 0.387 ¡0.058 0.499
Greece 0.918 0.105 ¡0.109 0.498
Spain 0.952 0.627 0.265 0.499
France 0.931 0.324 0.049 0.499
Ireland 0.970 0.744 0.450 0.499
Italy 0.931 0.342 ¡0.089 0.498
Netherlands 0.963 0.523 0.233 0.499
Austria 0.902 0.350 ¡0.056 0.498
Portugal 0.973 0.671 0.378 0.499
Finland 0.869 0.138 ¡0.007 0.496
Sweden 0.927 0.094 ¡0.010 0.498
United Kingdom 0.929 0.526 0.151 0.499
Notes:
1. Sample sizes as in Table 2A.
2. r(k) corresponds to the k-th order sample autocorrelation.
3. The standard error for r(k) under the hypothesis of no autocorrelation is 1=
p
n, where n is the number of
observations. It is 0.06 for all countries except Austria, Finland and Sweden where it is 0.08.
4. b d is the estimate of the long memory coe±cient in the representation of the series as fractional noise as in
(1 ¡ L)
diXit = ²t. All p-values of the hypothesis b d = 0.5 are zero at the fourth decimal place.
38Table 3: Di®erences in Average Change of Consumer Con¯dence
3 and 12 Months around Elections
Panel A Panel B
¹ yi;j means Ti;s(k) statistic
for j = ab,b,aa,a for s = a;b
Country Mean Type 3 12 3 12
Belgium All but Before 0.05 0.05
Before 0.02 ¡0.27 ¡0.76 ¡4.87
All but After 0.02 0.17
After 0.07 0.30 1.29 2.07
Denmark All but Before 0.01 ¡0.01
Before 0.38 0.37 15.29 8.51
All but After 0.01 0.10
After ¡0.34 ¡0.34 ¡14.47 ¡9.91
Germany All but Before ¡0.01 ¡0.11
Before 0.34 0.93 11.81 14.65
All but After 0.01 ¡0.04
After ¡0.34 ¡0.80 ¡11.85 ¡10.74
Greece All but Before ¡0.08 ¡0.40
Before 1.09 1.82 29.25 27.97
All but After ¡0.08 ¡0.33
After ¡0.43 ¡1.68 ¡8.66 ¡17.00
Spain All but Before ¡0.01 0.10
Before 0.19 0.14 7.34 0.64
All but After ¡0.00 ¡0.06
After ¡0.00 0.14 0.02 3.52
France All but Before 0.01 0.26
Before 0.51 0.76 13.97 7.12
All but After 0.02 ¡0.02
After ¡0.12 ¡0.10 ¡4.07 ¡1.10
Ireland All but Before 0.01 0.10
Before 0.08 0.26 3.22 3.92
All but After 0.02 0.05
After ¡0.11 ¡0.03 ¡6.21 ¡1.94
Table continued in next page
39Table 3 (cont.) Di®erences in Average Change of Consumer Con¯dence
3 and 12 Months around Elections
Panel A Panel B
¹ yi;j means Ti;s(k) statistic
for j = ab,b,aa,a for s = a;b
Country Mean Type 3 12 3 12
Italy All but Before ¡0.00 ¡0.02
Before 0.18 0.25 5.12 3.62
All but After ¡0.02 0.00
After 0.20 ¡0.63 5.97 ¡8.65
Netherlands All but Before ¡0.01 0.02
Before ¡0.01 0.41 ¡0.03 6.34
All but After 0.03 0.08
After ¡0.08 ¡0.52 ¡3.78 ¡9.84
Austria All but Before 0.02 0.15
Before 0.75 1.52 13.31 15.87
All but After 0.05 0.36
After ¡0.12 ¡1.13 ¡3.15 ¡17.26
Portugal All but Before ¡0.03 ¡0.19
Before 0.24 0.59 11.42 15.35
All but After ¡0.03 ¡0.03
After ¡0.13 ¡1.02 ¡4.37 ¡19.57
Finland All but Before 0.05 0.10
Before ¡0.18 ¡0.29 ¡3.22 ¡3.29
All but After 0.04 0.17
After ¡0.00 1.17 ¡0.56 8.52
Sweden All but Before 0.05 0.10
Before 0.40 1.15 7.07 9.25
All but After 0.06 0.32
After ¡0.32 0.03 ¡7.76 ¡2.56
United Kingdom All but Before ¡0.00 ¡0.11
Before 0.32 1.24 9.08 22.22
All but After 0.02 0.04
After ¡0.43 ¡0.59 ¡12.69 ¡10.40
Notes: please see the next page.
40Notes to Table 3:
1. Sample sizes as in Table 2A.
2. All reported results are for the change in standardized consumer con¯dence yit(k), equal to Cit=sic, where sci
is the corresponding standard deviation from Table 2. This was done in order to make the changes comparable
across countries.
3. The row labeled ab=All but Before has the mean of yit(k) for k = 3;12 for the all months in the sample except
the k months before each election, given by ¹ yi;ab(k)












5. The row labeled aa=All but After has the mean of yit(k) for all months in the sample except the k months after
each election, given by ¹ yi;aa(k)












7. nik denotes the total available observations for yit(k), nie denotes the number of elections that occur at dates
tj for j = 1;2;:::;nie, I
B
t is an indicator function that removes observations k months before each election,
taking the value of 0 in the set B
def = ft;t ¡ 1;:::;t ¡ k : t = tjg and the value of 1 otherwise. Similarly, I
A
t is
an indicator function that removes observations k months after each election, taking the value of 0 in the set
A
def = ft + k;t + k ¡ 1;:::;t : t = tjg and the value of 1 otherwise.
8. The statistic Ti;s(k) is de¯ned as Ti;s(k)
def =
p
nik ¡ nie [¹ yi;s(k) ¡ ¹ yi;as(k)]
syi(k)
; s = a;b, where syi(k) is full sample
standard deviation and is computed under the hypothesis that there are no mean di®erences.
.
41Table 4: Tests for Di®erences across Winning & Losing Elections of the Incumbent
Consumer Quarterly GDP Unemployment Long-Term Quarterly
Con¯dence Growth Interest Rate In°ation
F-test 0.28 0.38 0.36 0.00 0.06
t-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KS-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
1. All descriptive statistics and tests were calculated for the two series ( ¹ Z
IW; ¹ Z
IL) of monthly averages for consumer
con¯dence and the macroeconomic variables listed, for the period of all 25 months before and after the election.
2. Table entries are the p-values for tests of equality of variance (F-test), mean (t-test) and distribution (KS-test,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov).
3. The tests of Table 4 were also performed for each of the months before the elections, for the variable of consumer
con¯dence. The hypothesis of no mean di®erences was rejected at the 10% level for 9, 8, 7, 6 and 5 months before
the elections, while the hypothesis of no variance di®erences was rejected at the 10% level only for months 9 and
4 before the elections. The KS test rejects the hypothesis of equal distributions for months 7, 5 and 4 before the
elections at the 10% level.
42Table 5: De¯nitions of Model Variables
Variable Name De¯nition
Ritm binary indicator of re-election of incumbent government taking the value of zero when
the incumbent is not re-elected and unity when it is re-elected
Sitm is the di®erence in the percentage of votes between the incumbent and the winner
(when the incumbent looses the election) or the incumbent and the runner-up
(when the incumbent wins the election)
C1 Level of consumer con¯dence index (CCI) one month before the elections
C1 ¡ C7 Change in the level of CCI in the 6-month period preceding the month of elections
calculated as ccim
def = Ci;m¡1 ¡ Ci;m¡7, where Cis denotes the level of the CCI at
month s and where the election occurs at month m
RGDP real GDP growth in the 4-quarter period ending on the quarter of the elections
as yij
def = lnYi;j¡0 ¡ lnYi;j¡4, where Yis denotes real GDP at quarter s and where the
election occurs in a month of the j
th quarter
INF Change in consumer prices in the month before the elections
calculated as ¼im
def = lnPi;m¡1 ¡ lnPi;m¡2, where Pis denotes CPI at month s and
where the election occurs at month m
BY LD Long rate, level of 10-year bond yield in the month before the elections
G=GDP Growth of total government revenues as a % of GDP from the quarter period preceding
the month of elections calculated as gij
def = lnGi;j¡0 ¡ lnGi;j¡1, where Gis denotes
government spending as a % of GDP at quarter s and where the election occurs in
a month of the j
th quarter
T=GDP Growth of revenues of indirect taxes as a % of GDP from the quarter period preceding
the month of elections calculated as tij
def = lnTi;j¡0 ¡ lnTi;j¡1, where Tis denotes
indirect taxes as a % of GDP at quarter s and where the election occurs in
a month of the j
th quarter
Ca7 ¡ C0 Change in in the level of CCI in the 7-month period after the elections,
calculated as Ci;m+7 ¡ Ci;m
C0 ¡ C7 Change in the level of CCI in the 7-month period before the elections,
calculated as Ci;m ¡ Ci;m¡7
WSH The share of votes of the winning party in each election
WO Binary indicator for the orientation of the winning party in each election, taking
the value of zero when the winner is center-left and unity when the winner is center-right
D30 Binary indicator for a winning party with less than 30% share of electoral votes
V T Voter turnout, the share of voters in each election relative to all registered voters
43Table 6A: The In°uence of Consumer Con¯dence and Macroeconomic Variables
on the Probability of Re-election and on the Incremental Share of the Incumbent
Explanatory Variables
Dep. Var./Model C1 C1 ¡ C7 RGDP INF BY LD G=GDP T=GDP







M2 : Only Macroeconomic Variables
Ritm/Logit 0.44*** -1.64** 0.30**
(0.00) (0.05) (0.02)
Sitm/Pool-GLS 1.25*** -1.14 1.22***
(0.00) (0.56) (0.00)
Sitm/RE-GLS 1.03*** -0.35 1.20***
(0.00) (0.89) (0.00)
M3 : Consumer Con¯dence + Macroeconomic Variables
Ritm/Logit 0.05** -0.09* 0.44** -1.73* 0.46**
(0.02) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02)
Sitm/Pool-GLS 0.16*** -0.25*** 0.95** -2.44 1.67***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.29) (0.00)
Sitm/RE-GLS 0.17*** -0.35*** 1.15** -0.90 1.47***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.78) (0.00)
Table continued in next page
44Table 6A (cont.) The In°uence of Consumer Con¯dence and Macroeconomic Variables
on the Probability of Re-election and on the Incremental Share of the Incumbent
Explanatory Variables
Dep. Var./Model C1 C1 ¡ C7 RGDP INF BY LD G=GDP T=GDP
M4 : Consumer Con¯dence + Macroeconomic + Gov. Spending Variables
Ritm/Logit 0.03 -0.10 0.59*** -2.37** 0.56** 0.03
(0.23) (0.20) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.54)
Sitm/Pool-GLS 0.11* -0.26** 1.29*** -3.14 1.69*** 0.09***
(0.09) (0.04) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.01)
Sitm/RE-GLS 0.10* -0.32*** 1.40*** -1.31 1.43*** 0.14**
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) (0.02)
M5 : Consumer Con¯dence + Macroeconomic + Ind. Taxes Variables
Ritm/Logit 0.05 -0.14* 1.04*** -1.26 0.36 -0.61***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.00) (0.27) (0.14) (0.00)
Sitm/Pool-GLS 0.10* -0.48*** 1.98*** -3.24 1.68*** -0.88*
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.06)
Sitm/RE-GLS 0.10 -0.39*** 1.71*** -1.38 1.47*** -0.28
(0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.81)
M6 : Consumer Con¯dence + Macroeconomic via Dynamic GMM
Sitm/GMM 0.39*** -0.68*** 2.17***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes:
1. The dependent variables are: Ritm, the binary indicator for incumbent re-election and Sitm, the relative share of
votes of the incumbent.
2. For variables de¯nitions, please see Table 5.
3. The estimation is performed via Maximum Likelihood (logit model), pooled/random e®ects Generalized Least
Squares (GLS), and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with dynamic instruments.
4. The signi¯cance tests are based on robust standard errors. p-values are inside the parentheses. Asterisks denote
signi¯cance levels at: 1% ¤ ¤ ¤, 5% ¤¤ and 10% ¤.
5. Model M6 also contains a dynamic term, the lag of the dependent variable Si;t¡1;m, which is estimated at 0.14
and has a p-value of 0.05. In model M6, the macroeconomic variables were insigni¯cant, with the exception of
the bond-yield.
45Table 6B: Summary Statistics for the Models of Table 6A.
Summary
Dep. Var./Model Obs. LR=F-test R
2
M1
Ritm/Logit 74 0.103 4.89%
Sitm/Pool-GLS 74 0.056 3.25%
Sitm/RE-GLS 74 0.121 5.22%
M2
Ritm/Logit 78 0.001 16.60%
Sitm/Pool-GLS 78 0.000 22.72%
Sitm/RE-GLS 78 0.000 22.63%
M3
Ritm/Logit 66 0.002 22.44%
Sitm/Pool-GLS 66 0.000 29.24%
Sitm/RE-GLS 66 0.000 31.51%
M4
Ritm/Logit 50 0.015 25.21%
Sitm/Pool-GLS 50 0.000 29.73%
Sitm/RE-GLS 50 0.010 32.93%
M5
Ritm/Logit 40 0.013 31.86%
Sitm/Pool-GLS 40 0.001 27.12%
Sitm/RE-GLS 40 0.068 31.31%
M6
Sitm/GMM 38 0.000 5.88%
Notes:
1. The models correspond to those of Table 6A and include: M1 only consumer con¯dence variables; M2 only
macroeconomic variables; M3 both consumer con¯dence and macroeconomic variables; M4 consumer con¯dence,
macroeconomic and government spending variables; M5 consumer con¯dence, macroeconomic and indirect taxes
variables.
2. \Obs" denotes the number of observations; \LR=F-test" denotes either the likelihood ratio (for the logit model),
the regression F-test or a standard Wald-type test for testing the joint signi¯cance of all explanatory variables (for
the pooled/RE model and the GMM model respectively); \R
2" denotes either the McFadden pseudo R-squared
(for the logit model), the standard R-squared (for the pooled/RE model) or the squared correlation coe±cient
between the actual and ¯tted values (for the GMM model).
46Table 7: Reversal in Consumer Con¯dence
Explanatory Variables Summary
Dep. Var. Const: C0 ¡ C7 WSH WO WO£ D30 Obs. F-test R
2
/Model C0 ¡ C7
Ca7 ¡ C0/ -2.50*** -0.31** 69 0.00 11%
Pool-GLS (0.00) (0.02)
Ca7 ¡ C0/ -2.67*** -0.28** 69 0.03 6.8%
RE-GLS (0.00) (0.04)
Ca7 ¡ C0/ 11.74*** -0.14* -0.43*** 69 0.00 21%
Pool-GLS (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Ca7 ¡ C0/ 8.90*** -0.14 -0.34*** 69 0.00 22%
RE-GLS (0.00) (0.16) (0.00)
Ca7 ¡ C0/ 10.84*** -0.35** -0.37*** -4.61*** 0.51*** 3.40*** 69 0.00 47%
Pool-GLS (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ca7 ¡ C0/ 9.02*** -0.27** -0.32*** -3.35** 0.33 2.44* 69 0.00 27%
RE-GLS (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.08)
Notes:
1. For variables de¯nitions, please see Table 5.
2. The estimation is performed twice per model, via pooled and via random e®ects, both in Generalized Least Squares
(GLS).
3. The signi¯cance is based on robust standard errors. p-values are inside the parentheses. The asterisks denote
signi¯cance levels at: 1% ¤ ¤ ¤, 5% ¤¤ and 10% ¤.
4. \Obs." denotes the number of observations; \F-test" denotes the regression F-test; \R
2" denotes the standard
R-squared.
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Evolution of Average Consumer Confidence (s.d.= 1.656 )
Months before and after elections
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Paired t-tests for differences between election month
and months before and after the elections
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Average Consumer Confidence, 
France, Luxemburg, Finland, Sweden (s.d.= 5.31 )
Months before and after elections
 


















Average Consumer Confidence, 
rest of EU-15 (s.d.= 1.69 )
Months before and after elections
 
















Evolution of Average Consumer Confidence Split by Election Outcome
Months before and after elections
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Evolution of Long Term Rates Split by Election Outcome
Months before and after elections
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Evolution of Unemployment Split by Election Outcome
Months before and after elections
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Evolution of Quarterly Inflation (p.a.) by Election Outcome
Quarters before and after elections
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Evolution of Quarterly Real GDP Growth (p.a.) by Election Outcome
Quarters before and after elections
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Evolution of Government Spending as % of GDP by Election Outcome
Quarters before and after elections
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Evolution of Indirect Tax Revenues as % of GDP by Election Outcome
Quarters before and after elections
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Cumulative Probability of Re-election, Model M3
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Probability of Re-election
Linear fit in segment [-40,0]: 0.80 + 0.011*C1
Linear fit in segment (0,+40]: 0.81 + 0.004*C1











Evolution of Average Consumer Confidence, Univ. of Michigan, since 1978
Months before and after elections
 

















Univ. of Michigan - Split by Election Outcome





















Evolution of Average Consumer Confidence, Conference Board, since 1967
Months before and after elections
 






















Conference Board - Split by Election Outcome
Months before and after elections
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Figure 9